Recently, various protocols have been proposed for securely outsourcing database storage to a third party server, ranging from systems with "full-fledged" security based on strong cryptographic primitives such as fully homomorphic encryption or oblivious RAM, to more practical implementations based on searchable symmetric encryption or even on deterministic and order-preserving encryption. On the flip side, various attacks have emerged that show that for some of these protocols confidentiality of the data can be compromised, usually given certain auxiliary information.
INTRODUCTION
As organizations struggle with the accumulation of large amounts of data, a popular practice is to outsource them to third party servers. Because their data may be sensitive (e.g., medical or financial), a natural idea is to employ cryptographic techniques to ensure confidentiality while still allowing efficient query processing.
Many cryptographic techniques exist that can be applied to this problem, ranging from solutions based on tools such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [20, 46] or oblivious RAM (ORAM) [23, 25] to more practical solutions based on weaker primitives such as structural encryption [33] or deterministic and order-preserving encryption [42, 2] . However, the privacy provided by the resulting secure outsourced database systems is poorly understood. For example, recent works focusing on some practical solutions [28, 3, 31, 11, 38] , have shown that confidentiality can be compromised given auxiliary information on the data.
Here, we take a step back and identify a need for a formal understanding of the inherent efficiency/privacy trade-off in outsourced database systems, independent of the details of the system. In particular, we develop the first attack against systems leaking only communication volume. This attack applies even to systems based on FHE or ORAM.
A Taxonomy. In order to reason about which protocols have which leakage channels (and how to design new protocols without them), it is useful to distinguish some classes of outsourced database systems. In particular, we define atomic outsourced database systems, where the server stores a collection of ciphertexts such that each record in the dataset (or rather the search key for each record) is encrypted as one of these ciphertexts, but there may be additional ciphertexts encrypting a dummy record; further, communication from the server on a query includes some subset of these ciphertexts. It is useful to also define static atomic systems, where the encrypted records are not changed as a result of a query, and non-storage-inflating atomic systems, where the number of encrypted records is equal to the number of records in the database. We observe that static atomic systems that are non-storage-inflating must leak the access pattern, i.e., which of the encrypted records are returned on a query. This covers most systems based on searchable symmetric encryption or on deterministic and order-preserving encryption [42, 2, 4] . In the more general (not necessarily atomic) setting, we also define fixed communication overhead protocols, where the length of communication sent from the server as a result of a query is proportional to the number of records matching the query. Systems simply based on FHE or ORAM have fixed communication overhead. We observe that such systems leak the communication volume.
Reconstruction Attacks. We develop reconstruction attacks on outsourced database systems where either access pattern or communication volume is leaked, and thus our attacks apply to most solutions proposed in prior work. In a reconstruction attack an adversary exploits leakage to recover the search keys. A successful reconstruction attack should recover a significant fraction of the search keys with good probability, preferably in polynomial-time and with a polynomial number of queries in the database size. Here we consider a rather weak adversarial model (hence making our attacks stronger) in which the untrusted server only knows the underlying query distribution (i.e., does not have prior knowledge about the stored data and does not get to directly learn the issued queries or their results). Thus, unlike prior work [28, 3, 31, 11, 38] our adversary is passive (does not choose the queries) and does not get any auxiliary information about the data. Our attacks specifically apply to outsourced database systems for range queries. Furthermore, we will assume queries are uniform. Clearly, these are limiting assumptions but they are an important natural basic case to start with; see discussion below.
Attacks using Access Pattern. Our reconstruction attack using the access pattern proceeds in two phases: first, the adversary identifies a record with the minimal (or maximal) value. Then, it uses the frequency in which this record is returned on random queries to determine its index. Finally it uses statistics on the occurrence of other records with the minimal record to determine their index. A simple analysis, based on Chernoff bounds, shows that the adversary can exactly reconstruct the entire index set after observing O(N 4 ) queries, where N is the domain size, assuming queries are uniform. For dense databasesÕ(N 2 ) queries suffice.
Attacks Using Communication Volume. Our reconstruction attacks using communication volume proceed as follows.
Let n be the number of records in the dataset. The attacker first observes O(N 4 ) queries and determines for every value of 0 ≤ i ≤ n the number ui of range queries (out of all possible queries) which return exactly i records. Next, the adversary derives a polynomial F (x) whose positive integer coefficients are computable from u1, . . . , un. It turns out that if F (x) uniquely factors into two polynomials d(x), d
R (x) then each of these polynomials can be used to recover the entire index set. That was true for all datasets in our experiments.
A Matching Lowerbound. We complement our attacks with a lowerbound showing the existence of datasets that cannot be distinguished by attackers that observe significantly less than N 4 uniformly chosen range queries. This lowerbound holds both for attacks using access pattern and for attacks using communication volume.
Experiments. In order to demonstrate our attacks, we have built the following prototype. The server is instantiated as a mySQL server, and the users upload their data and query them through a CryptDB proxy. A packet sniffer residing on the server side monitors the query answers, and executes our attacks. We attacked several real datasets with different indexed domains, number of records, and record distributions. The average size of each dataset was a few thousands of records. After collecting the required number of queries, our attacks ran in a few seconds for the worst case. Both attacks (i.e., using the access pattern and using the communication volume) managed to reconstruct all datasets.
Discussion
In reality queries are not uniform. However, we believe that our attacks represent a significant weakness that needs to be addressed, because (1) good systems should provide protection regardless of query distribution (2) uniform or almost uniform queries on a small subset of the domain are realistic, and when that happens our attacks apply, and (3) other than the assumption on the query distribution, our attack model is very weak. Our attacks show that secure outsourced databases should avoid being static non-storageinflating, as well as with fixed communication overhead.
Open Questions.
We leave open the question on which datasets our reconstruction attack using communication volume succeeds. Additionally, it's open to extend our attacks to other query distributions and also to use only "short" range queries, as they are typically observed in practice. Finally, our attacks require N 4 queries in general and an open question is which privacy guarantees can be made when N is large. We note that in the case of order-preserving encryption, security on very large domains was studied by [8] , who showed that OPE hides half of the bits of each plaintext for a dataset of uniformly chosen points (where the adversary gets the OPE encryptions of these points).
Related Work
Work in Cryptographic Community. For an overview of cryptographic techniques for search on encrypted data, we recommend the talk of Kamara [32] . Broadly, the techniques include multi-party computation [47, 24] , oblivious RAM [25, 25] , searchable symmetric and structural encryp-tion [45, 22, 13, 15, 14, 12, 40, 19, 33] , functional encryption [9, 43] , property-preserving encryption [5, 1, 7, 39] and homomorphic encryption [10, 21] . These techniques provide different levels of security based on their leakage. In particular, [32] distinguishes between L1 and L2 leakage where access pattern corresponds to L2 leakage, but neither one considers communication volume. [37] identifies the basic leakages of schemes that combine searchable encryption and ORAM. It refers to access pattern leakage as LC3, and communication volume as LC2.
Work in Database Community. In the database community, the problem of querying an encrypted database was introduced by [26] . Depending on the query type, different methods have been proposed. In this work, we focus on range queries over arithmetic valued attributes. Existing solutions for range queries can be divided into three categories; (i) bucketization techniques that partition the domain space and group data records before indexing (e.g. [27, 29, 28] ), (ii) order-preserving encryption schemes that use deterministic encryption which ensures that the order of the cyphertexts is the same as the order of the plaintexts (e.g. [1, 7, 41] ), and (iii) solutions that use specialized data structures (e.g. [35, 44, 17] ). Finally, notable examples of outsourced database systems that support range queries are CryptDB [42] , Cipherbase [2] , and TrustedDB [4] .
Attacks. Several works (e.g., [28, 3, 31] ) have shown that all the current methods allowing range queries on encrypted data can reveal information about the distribution of the plaintext values on the search domain. Islam, Kuzu, and Kantarcioglu [30] studied attacks exploiting access pattern based on auxiliary information. Liu, Zhu, Wang and Tan [36] developed such attacks based on the query pattern (i.e., information about which queries repeat). Recently, attacks on existing systems have been introduced ( [11, 38] ), but these attacks are application dependent as they make assumptions about the data distribution and exploit weaknesses of specific encryption protocols (e.g., OPE). Finally, [16] is the closest to our work. It is similarly general, assuming only access pattern is leaked. However, the presented attack only recovers (partial) order of the records depending on the retrieved range queries. Applied to our setting where the queries are uniformly drawn, it can reconstruct the full order after observing enough answers. Specifically, the algorithm first considers all possible orders of records, and then prunes some of them by observing answers of queries.
THE MODEL
We describe our abstract models of secure outsourced database systems. While the focus of our work is on attacks, our models are general enough to prove positive results as well.
Outsourced database systems
We abstract a database as a collection of records associated with search keys
We will assume that all records have fixed length κ, and that search keys are elements of domain X (essentially, the search keys can be viewed as the database indexing information).
A query is a predicate q : X → {0, 1}.
Applying a query q to a database D results in all records whose search keys satisfy q, i.e.,
Example 2.1. Throughout this article X will be an ordered domain of N ∈ N elements {1, . . . , N }. We will consider the family of interval or range queries
Overall, there are 
Let Q be a collection of queries. An outsourced database system for queries in Q consists of two protocols between a user U and a server S:
Setup protocol Π setup : U has as input a database D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)}; S has no input. The output for U is a query key K and the output for S is a data structure DS.
1
Query protocol Π query : U has as input a query q ∈ Q and the key K produced in the setup protocol; S has as input DS produced in the setup protocol. The output for U is q(D); S has no formal output.
We note that our model is somewhat similar to the notion of structured encryption due to Chase and Kamara [14] , but is more general and applies more easily to general protocols for outsourced database systems.
Atomic Systems. We also define the special case that the outsourced database system is atomic in the following sense:
1. DS = (DS1, DS2) where DS1 = (c1, . . . , c n } contains encrypted records and DS2 depends solely on (sk1, . . . , skn) (but not on the content of r1, . . . , rn). For correctness, DS1 should contain at least one encrypted copy of each of the records r1, . . . , rn. It may also contain additional encryptions of records in the database or encryptions of dummy records (hence, generally n ≥ n).
2. The communication sent from S to U consists of elements of DS1 plus information that depends solely on DS2 (and hence does not depend on r1, . . . , rn).
Static and Non-Static: For simplicity of exposition, the above refers more specifically to the static atomic case: there are no updates to D beyond initial setup, and, furthermore, no updates to DS while queries are made. More generally, we can allow U and S in Π query to also take as inputs their current states and output new states. This in particular allows them to modify the query key K and DS, respectively.
Non-Storage-Inflating: In the case that n = n above (and hence the server-side storage contains no additional encryptions of records in the database or dummy records) we say the protocol is non-storage inflating. We observe that most of the existing practical systems such as CryptDB and Cipherbase are non-storage-inflating.
Fixed Communication Overhead. In the general (not necessarily atomic) setting we define another class of outsourced database systems we call fixed communication overhead. We say that an outsourced database system for Q has fixed communication overhead if for any database D of size n there are constants α and β (depending only on the security parameter and n) such that for any sequence of queries q1, . . . , q k ∈ Q, after Π setup is run on D and Π query is run on qi for each i = 1 to k, the length of communication from S to U on the i-th execution of Π query is α · |qi(D)| + β. 
Adversarial models
We present generic attacks on the privacy of secure outsourced databases by an honest-but-curious S. Intuitively, we want to guarantee that all S can learn is some well defined "leakage." As discussed above, this typically includes the pattern of accesses to encrypted records in DS1, or the number of records retrieved by U in every execution of Π query . To be more general, we follow a formalization of Chase and Kamara [14] in the context of "structured encryption."
For an outsourced database system Π, assume a fixed database sampling algorithm databaseGen, query sampling algorithm QueryGen, leakage functions L setup , L query , and simulator Sim. Consider the following experiments 3 :
Real Experiment: Sample D ← databaseGen where D = {(r1, sk1), . . . , (rn, skn)} and run Π setup (D, ⊥). Then, repeat the following until S halts: Sample q ← QueryGen and run Π query (q, DS). The output of the experiment is the output of S.
Then, repeat the following until Sim halts: Sample q ← QueryGen, run L query (q, sk1, . . . , skn), and give the result to Sim. The output of the experiment is the output of Sim.
Definition 2.2. We say that outsourced database system Π is (L setup , L query )-secure if there is a simulator Sim such that for any databaseGen, QueryGen the output distributions of the above experiments are computationally indistinguishable.
Above L setup is called the "setup leakage" and L query is called the "query leakage." We identify the fundamental leakage channels of outsourced database systems as special cases of the query leakage.
Access Pattern Leakage: In the case of L query for an atomic outsourced database system, we define the special case L access (called "access pattern leakage") that outputs a subset of S ⊆ [n ] corresponding to indices in DS1 = (c1, . . . , c n ) encrypting a record matching the query, i.e., S contains exactly those indices i ∈ [n ] for which ci is an encryption of some rj such that rj ∈ q(D).
Communication Volume Leakage:
In the general (not necessarily atomic) setting, we also define the special case L comm (called "communication volume leakage") that outputs |q(D)|. Note that in the case of an atomic outsourced database system, this corresponds to |S| above.
Leakage of atomic systems and fixed communication overhead. We observe that static, atomic, and non-storageinflating outsourced database systems leak the access pattern, i.e., their query leakage includes L access . This includes practical systems based on searchable symmetric encryption or on deterministic and order-preserving encryption. Similarly, outsourced database protocols with fixed communication overhead leak the communication volume, i.e., their query leakage includes L comm . This includes "fullfledged" protocols based on FHE or ORAM in the natural way.
Remark 2.3. While some specific implementations of outsourced database systems may also leak to S information about the query q and sk1, . . . , skn, aiming for generality we ignore this additional leakage in our attacks.
Reconstruction attacks
We will be mostly interested in reconstruction attacks [18] (a.k.a. blatant non-privacy) on outsourced database systems. In a reconstruction attack, an adversary exploits leakage to recover the search keys. As it is possible to encrypt the database records with a semantically secure encryption scheme, a reconstruction attack results in the maximum information an attacker could learn about the database. The existence of a reconstruction attack hence demonstrates a complete failure of the outsourced database system to keep the dataset private beyond what is achieved by storing the encrypted records with cleartext indexing information.
4 Our goal will be to demonstrate the existence of reconstruction attacks with a weak adversary: passive, with no prior knowledge about the dataset, and with no ability to decipher the queries issued by U.
Namely, consider the ideal experiment where Sim outputs a guess {ŝk1, . . . ,ŝkn}.
where ∆ denotes symmetric set difference. If α = 0 and β is inverse polynomial, we say that Π is fully reconstructible (w.r.t. databaseGen, QueryGen, L setup , L query ) .
Remark 2.5. When our attack algorithms succeed they produce two candidate search key sets one of which is exactly {sk1, . . . , skn} and the other is its reflection over the domain [1, . . . , N ], i.e., {N − sk1, . . . , N − skn}.
Note that the above models the scenario that the adversary possibly knows the distributions of either the data or the queries (or both), but does not directly learn the issued queries or their results. Thus, we consider a relatively weak adversarial model for reconstruction attacks. In fact, our main reconstruction attacks only use adversarial knowledge of the distribution of queries and the data can be arbitrary.
In contrast to previous attacks on specific systems [30, 36, 11, 38] , our goal is to capture the fundamental leakage rather than the weaknesses of a specific implementation, database, or cryptographic tool.
To summarize, we consider a passive attacker that does not bring her previous domain knowledge (e.g., no assumptions on the data distribution), cannot affect the dataset (e.g., by injecting records), and does not directly query the database. We assume that the adversary knows the domain size, the total number of records, and that the output of QueryGen is uniform. Finally, the adversary can only observe the encrypted answers of queries.
In the sequel, we devise reconstruction attacks on outsourced database systems for range queries. We first consider the leaked access pattern model (Section 3), and then the leaked communication volume model (Section 4).
ATTACK USING THE ACCESS PATTERN
We present an attack using access pattern leakage, i.e., assuming the query leakage L query includes L access . Such leakage is typical for current systems based on deterministic primitives such as order-preserving encryption, or on symmetric searchable encryption.
Attack Overview. Assume that the database consists of n records and sk1, . . . , skn are their (unknown) search keys (i.e., positions in the domain X = {1, . . . , N }). Let i1, . . . , in be the actual order of sk1, . . . , skn. We assume for simplicity that there is at most one record per position, but the attack trivially extends to the general case. The algorithm initially determines its guess for the order of the sets of records,î1, . . . ,în. This could be done using the method of [16] , but we give a simpler and more efficient method using our assumption on the query distribution. Namely, the algorithm first samples enough queries so that all subsets of indices that can match a query are returned with high probability. It determinesî1 by searching the query results for the largest proper subset of the set of all indices, takinĝ i1 to be the symmetric difference of the two. Givenî1, it determinesî2 by searching the query results for the smallest proper superset ofî1. In general, givenî1, . . . ,îj−1, the algorithm determinesîj by searching the query results for the smallest proper superset ofî1, . . . ,îj−1.
If we have at least one record per a domain position (i.e., no empty domain positions), then, recovering the order suffices for the reconstruction attack. Otherwise, we have to determine the position of each record in the domain, in order to identify which positions are empty. Towards this, after determining the order, the attack determines its guess for the exact positions of the records,ŝk1, . . . ,ŝkn by exploiting the uniformity of the QueryGen. Specifically, it utilizes the number of queries that include only the records at positions ski 1 ski 2 , . . . , ski j , which is unique for each domain position. Interestingly, this phase of the attack does not use the order of the records beyond the first record, but we include order recovery because it suffices in the case that the records are dense in the domain. The pseudocode and detailed description of the attack are in Appendix B.
Next, we show the correctness of the attack and bounds on the number of required queries p1 for recovering the order, and p2 for recovering the positions.
Main Result. To showcase the attack, we prove the following theorem.
We note that if the records are dense in the domain, recovering only the order suffices for a reconstruction attack, in which case we require only O(N 2 log N ) queries. This is why we include full order recovery in the attack.
Proof. The theorem follows via Claims 3.2 and 3.3.
Then, an execution of GetOrder O (see Appendix B) returns the correct output (up to reflection) with inverse polynomial probability.
Proof. The claim follows by the coupon collector's problem. A Matching Lowerbound. To conclude this section, we show the optimality of our attack in terms of the number of queries that need to be observed. 
ATTACK USING THE COMMUNICATION VOLUME
Access pattern attacks can be avoided using cryptographic tools such as Oblivious RAM and Fully Homomorphic Encryption, and it is tempting conclude that such measures suffice to prevent reconstruction attacks against outsourced database systems. However, here we show that such an attack assuming that the query leakage L query includes L comm .
Attack Overview. Let n be the total number of records.
We label them according to their order in the domain as 
(Equivalently, extend the range to also include the points 0 and N + 1 and assume two additional "fake" records on these locations, i.e., sk0 = 0 and skn+1 = N + 1 and define di = ski+1 −ski). Figure 1 shows an example for N = 8 and n = 4 where dots represent the domain positions, and each box represents a record. The positions of the records are sk1 = 2, sk2 = 4, sk3 = 7, and sk4 = 8, and we compute d0 = sk1 = 2, d1 = sk2 − sk1 = 2, d2 = sk3 − sk2 = 3, d3 = sk4 − sk3 = 1, and d4 = 8 − sk4 + 1 = 1.
There are exactly Then, we can express u1, . . . , un andû0 in terms of the values di. Specifically,
For example, if d0 = 2 and dn = 1 as in Figure 1 , then two queries (q [1,N ] and q [2,N ] ) out of the N 2 + N would include these two (and hence all) records. Similarly, we get
The number of queriesû0 that return no records is a special case, and we add the equation
. By setting u0 = 2 ·û0 + N + 1, we get the following system of n + 1 quadratic equations over the non-negative integers:
We now show how to solve this system of quadratic equations. Consider the polynomial
and its "mirror" polynomial
and define
A crucial observation is that the coefficients of F (x) are u0, . . . , un:
I.e., we can construct F (x) by determining the values ui based on the query answers volume, and, furthermore, factoring F (x) into two polynomials with non-negative integer coefficientsd(x) and its "mirror"d R (x) provides a solution to the system 1.
If F (x) uniquely factors into two polynomials with nonnegative integer coefficients then these would be d(x) and d R (x) and hence u0, . . . , un suffice for exact reconstruction. In practice, one can use algorithms for factoring polynomials with integer coefficients, e.g., the LLL algorithm [34] . Figure 2 Main Result. The attack described above provides full reconstruction when F (x) uniquely factors into irreducible d(x), d R (x) over the integers. In case the factorization of F (x) results in more than 2 irreducible factors, there may be more than two candidate solutions for the database, and the algorithm picks an arbitrary solution.
Remark 4.1. We give an example where a dataset is not uniquely reconstructed. Let N = 11 and consider a dataset with sk1 = 1, sk2 = 6. This corresponds to d(x) = 1 + 5x + 6x 2 (and d R (x) = 6 + 6x + x 2 ). We get that
Over the integers, F (x) factors as (1 + 2x)(2 + x)(1 + 3x)(3 + x). Our attack algorithm may hence choose to recover d(x) = (1 + 2x)(3 + x) = 3+7x+2x 2 (and d R (x) = (2+x)(1+3x)) which results in sk1 = 3, sk2 = 10. Note that this is not a reflection of the true dataset.
We note here that our experiments indicate that for real life databases the factorization is likely to result in two irreducible factors d(x) and dR(x). Indeed, this was the case for all 6,786 datasets used in our evaluation (Section 5.2 below). 5 As described, FactorF O finds one solution to
, it can be modified to find all such solutions. Oracle O: Remark 4.2. Factorization might be slow for large number of records. Thus, we design a simple algorithm (see Appendix E) that checks the possible combinations of di's in order to determine the correct values, and is faster than factorization in practice.
To complete the attack description, we now give a bound on the number of queries needed for estimating the coefficients u[i]. 
Proof. Our algorithm factorizes F (x) (line 3). If d(x)
is irreducible over the integers, then the factoring of
Next, we show the optimality of our attack in the number of required queries.
Lemma 4.5. Let the output of QueryGen be uniform. Then there is a distribution databaseGen such that no outsourced database system for range queries that leaks the communication volume is fully reconstructable wrt. databaseGen, QueryGen, L setup , and L comm with O(N 4 ) queries, where L setup is arbitrary.
Proof. The proof derives directly from Claim D.1 in the Appendix D.
EXPERIMENTS
We implemented and ran our attacks on an Intel Core i7 2.5GHz machine with 16GB of RAM, running MacOS 10.11. Using Parallels, we created two virtual machines running Ubuntu Linux 14.04, each with 2 CPU cores and 4GB of memory. Specifically, our implementation is depicted in Figure 3 . We installed mySQL server on the first virtual machine (hereafter called server), and CryptDB on the second (called proxy). We implemented our client in Java and ran it on the proxy. The client stores a database to the server through the CryptDB proxy, and chooses an attribute to be indexed. The CryptDB proxy encrypts each record before storing it to the mySQL server. Then, the user asks range queries on the indexed attribute, the CryptDB proxy retrieves the required encrypted records from the server, decrypts them, and sends them back to the user. Additionally, we implemented a packet sniffer in Java, residing on the server side, which can only observe the network packets from the server to the proxy. In our implementation, the sniffer ignores the communication between the user and the proxy. Finally, the packet sniffer performs our attacks. In order to evaluate the performance of each attack, we encrypted and uploaded to the server the 518 datasets from the Texas Hospital Inpatient Discharge Public Use Data File of 2008 (PUDF) 6 , and the 1049 datasets from the 2009 HCUP Nationwide Inpatient Sample (NIS) 7 . Each dataset represents a specific hospital, and consists of records of hospitalized patients. We indexed different attributes deriving in 6 http://archive.ahrq.gov/ 7 http://www.hcup-us.ahrq.gov/ total 6,786 databases and ran the attacks on all of them. Both the attack using the access pattern and the attack using the communication volume successfully reconstructed all the search keys in every case. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of each data source. The datasets and the domains are similar to those in [38] . The average number of patients per hospital from the PUDF source is 5,612 (with minimum 1 and maximum 55,605). Each patient record has size 1,486 bytes (1,547 bytes after the encryption). We used 3 attributes of the PUDF datasets as the ordered domains for the range queries, namely Mortality Risk, Age, and Length of Stay. The Mortality Risk has 4 possible values; minor, moderate, major, and extreme. The Age domain consists of 22 different values, each representing an age interval, instead of a specific age in years. We further divided it into two domains; one for patients under the age of 18, and one for adult patients, assuming that some users are only interested in these attribute values. The Length of Stay represents the number of days a patient was hospitalized. Each domain position is a specific number of days, ranging from 0 to 364. Finally, the combinations of search keys and datasets produce essentially 2,590 different databases because for each domain, the records are distributed differently.
The NIS datasets incorporate similar information, with average number of patients equal to 7,435 (minimum 1 and maximum 121,663) and record size of 621 bytes (684 bytes after the encryption). However, there is no Mortality Risk information. As such, we indexed only the Age and Length of Stay attributes. Again, we divided the Age domain into two additional domains for minor and adult patients respectively. NIS has more detailed age information, i.e., each domain position represents a specific age in years, ranging from 0 to 124. The effective databases are in this case 4,196. We first gathered enough queries in order to be able to run each attack. The user issues uniformly drawn range queries to the proxy. For each query, the proxy retrieves the encrypted records, decrypts them, and sends them back to the user. Then, the client asks the next query. The running time depends on the number of required queries (or in the domain size), the number of records to decrypt, the network speed, and the number of users. For all the datasets, this time varied from some seconds to one month (for retrieving N 4 queries on the large domain with size N = 365). For datasets where the required time for executing enough queries exceeded an hour, we simulated the query retrieval. However, we expect that in real life scenarios the system is running for more than several months, and more importantly, that several users are issuing queries. In case of 100 users issuing queries, the packet sniffer would gather enough information 100 times faster (e.g., only a few hours for the largest domain size of N = 365), because it can capture the packets of all the users simultaneously. Finally, we note that our attack always succeeds to fully reconstruct the records on the domain. In this section we evaluate the running time of the attack using the access pattern leakage. Table 2 summarizes our results. Column Ordering represents the average required time to recover the order of the records using N 2 log N queries, while Positions depicts the average time needed to recover the positions, requiring N 4 queries. If a dataset is dense, then the attack terminates when it determines the order. The last column represents the percentage of datasets where the targeted domain is dense.
Access Pattern Attack
The attack on the PUDF datasets for the Mortality Risk attribute ran in milliseconds. Moreover, 85% of the datasets have dense domain, rendering the ordering sufficient to reconstruct the data, and thus, it only requires to observe N 2 log N queries. For domains extracted from the age attribute, the running time is similar to that for the Mortality Risk. Recall that the age attribute has a small domain, since the original data report the age range for each patient. 67.3% of datasets that include only the records of adults have dense domains, where for records with age < 18 there are 34.1% dense domains, and for all the ages, we have 32.2% dense domains. For the Length of Stay attribute, recovering the order took 43 milliseconds, and the positions 4.2 seconds. In this case, we only encountered sparse domains.
Regarding the NIS datasets, the attack recovered the order in a few milliseconds for all the attributes. However, it was enough for reconstruction only for 31.2% datasets with domain representing ages younger than 18. All the other domains were sparse, and as such, the attack completed in 0.2 to 3.4 seconds.
Communication Volume Attack
Next, we evaluate our attack utilizing only the communication volume leakage. In order to determine the values of u array, i.e., the coefficients of the F (x) polynomial, we have retrieved N 4 queries. After building vector u, we performed the attack using the factorization algorithm and the brute-force version (Appendix E). Due to the large amount of records, the factorization algorithm needed several hours to terminate. As such, we only ran it on datasets with fewer than 150 records. However, our brute-force attack terminated in seconds for the complete datasets in all cases. More importantly, the attack successfully reconstructed all the data, i.e., d(x) was irreducible in all 6,786 databases. Table 3 summarizes the attack performance. Column Factor shows the average running time of the attack using the factorization algorithm, after constructing the u vector with the coefficients of F (x). Column BruteForce depicts the average running time of our brute-force algorithm, showing that in practice it terminates within a few milliseconds. The reconstruction attack using the factorization method runs in a few minutes for almost all the settings, since it was executed only for datasets with fewer than 150 records. For larger datasets we observed that it required hours and hence, we omit the results. On the other hand, the running time of the brute force attack is much shorter (runs in milliseconds), and depends mainly on the number of records. Interestingly, the attack is slower when reconstructing the age attribute than the Length of Stay, although the number of records are almost the same. This is due to the fact that the distribution of the Length of Stay values is highly skewed, with the majority of records concentrated in the first few domain positions. As such, the brute force algorithm can prune values of di's that correspond to more uniformly distributed data early on, resulting in fewer candidate datasets to check. 
Chernoff:
2 /3 and
Theorem A.2 (Azuma's inequality). Let Xi be a martingale satisfying |Xi − Xi−1| < ∆. Then, for all > 0
We get the following corollary:
B. PSEUDOCODE OF THE ATTACK USING THE ACCESS PATTERN Figure 4 shows the pseudocode of the attack. 
C. PROOF OF CLAIM 3.3
Proof. For i ≤ j ≤ m, let Ej be the event that ski j is correctly recovered; here we allow the position to be recovered up to reflection, as long as the reflection is consistent for all the positions. Our goal is to set p2 to ensure that all of the Ej's occur together with inverse polynomial probability. Using a union bound
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let Aj be the random variable counting the number of queries that match the records with positions ski 1 , ski 2 , . . . , ski j . We first show how to set p2 to 8 This procedure ensures that we receive the correct positions, up to reflection, when all the records lie on either the first or second half of the domain. Oracle O:
Let L be a query result of the form L = {î 1 , . . . ,î j−1 } ∪ {k} 6.î j ← k 7. Return (î 1 , . ensure that E1 happens with inverse polynomial probability. According to GetDist O :line 3, to ensure E1 happens with inverse polynomial probability, we want that A1/p2 ∈ 2ski 1 (N − ski 1 + 1) N (N + 1) ± with probability at least 1 − δ, for = O(1/N 2 ) and inverse polynomial δ. To see that = O(1/N 2 ) suffices, note that we want that for choices of z different from ski 1 and its reflection is Ω(1/N 2 ). But this follows from the fact that the absolute value of the numerator is at least 1 in this case. Now using . Thus, we set e −2p 2 2 = δ. Solving for p2 we get p2 = O(N 4 log N ) as desired. A similar argument shows that when p2 = O(N 4 log N ) the probability of Ej given E1 is inverse polynomial probability for each j ≥ 2, using the fact that the subsequent p2 queries after the first p2 queries are independently sampled (GetDist O :line 4). In the argument we can take say δ = O(1/N 2 ) (instead of simply any inverse polynomial as above) so that the overall expression in Equation 5 is inverse polynomial as desired.
D. OPTIMALITY OF OUR ATTACKS
Here we show that our reconstruction attacks are nearly optimal. Namely, we show that for an outsourced database system for range queries, there are two datasets D1 and D2 such that an adversary needs to observe Ω(N 4 ) uniformly chosen queries to distinguish whether D1 or D2 is outsourced. This bound holds for either L access or L comm leakage functions.
Theorem D.1. Let the output of QueryGen be uniform. Then there is a distribution databaseGen such that no outsourced database system for range queries is fully reconstructable w.r.t. databaseGen, QueryGen, L setup , L query with O(N 4 ) queries, where L setup is arbitrary and L query includes L comm .
Proof. Let D1 and D2 be equal-sized databases where in D1 all records lie at position sk1 = (N + 1)/2, and in D2 all records lie at sk2 = sk1 + 1 (assume N is odd). With both databases, an adversary can observe see exactly two types of queries: those that return all records record and those that return no records.
The total number of different queries is T = N (N + 1)/2. In case of D1 the number of non-empty queries is T1 = (N +1) 2 
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and hence the probability of observing a non-empty query is p = T1/T . In case of D2 the probability to receive a non-empty query p + δ where δ = 1/T .
Consider a setting where the database is chosen to be D1 or D2 with equal probability before the adversary begin observing queries. The adversary's a priory belief is that the database is D1 or D2 with equal probability. After observing each query answer, the adversary updates her belief. Let Pr[D1|a1, a2, . . . , ai] be the posterior probability the database is D1, and Pr[D2|a1, a2, . . . , ai] be the posterior probability the database is D2, after observing i queries.
Writing the log-ratio of the posterior probabilities and using Bayes rule we can describe how the adversary's confi-
